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Abstract 
In this paper, we study judicial attitudes and decision-making in mass litigation in the light of 
social sciences, namely rational choice theory and behavioural economics. These insights offer 
complementary views that are relevant in times where judges have been assigned increased 
responsibilities in our societies. We notably argue that even though recent discussions at the 
European level as well as in several Member-States have urged judges to play ‘prominent’ and 
‘leading’ roles when monitoring mass proceedings, a key issue has however often been omitted: 
are these expectations ultimately realistic? Social sciences tend to nuance the great expectations 
nowadays shared by many policymakers.   
We first discuss the different roles assigned to judges in the context of mass litigation. Then, we 
study judicial attitudes from the perspective of rational choice theory. A behavioural approach 
follows and addresses the effects associated with the magnitude of mass disputes on judicial 
decision-making. Finally, we apply these insights to a mass proceeding, namely the Dutch 
Collective Settlement of Mass Claim (WCAM). 
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1. Introduction 
 
The study of judicial behaviour and judicial decision-making has progressively pervaded social 
sciences and been embraced by economists and psychologists. This research sheds light on the 
way judges manage and decide cases beyond the ‘mythology of legal decision-making’ which 
posits that judges are neutral decision-makers applying law to facts.
1
 Initially sceptical to these 
new approaches inherited from the North-American tradition
2
 and viewed as attempts to 
desacralize the judicial institution,
3
 legal scholars have progressively perceived the mutual 
benefits brought by these different perspectives which contribute to renew the role of the 
judiciary by discussing judges’ strengths and weaknesses. These insights offer complementary 
views that are very relevant in times where judges have been assigned increased responsibilities 
in our society.  
 
A manifestation of judges’ growing importance regards their role in mass litigation, so cases that 
involve many claimants and large-scale damage. From a procedural point of view, tools to handle 
mass litigation are multiple. They encompass class action, representative action, group action and 
other collective devices. Cappelletti prophesied a few decades ago that the rise of ‘big businesses’ 
as by-product of ever-increasing consumption and production would sooner or later require the 
implementation of ‘big judiciaries’.4 Recent discussions at the European level as well as in 
several Member-States have urged judges to play ‘prominent’ and ‘leading’ roles when 
monitoring mass proceedings to avoid the costs and abuses usually associated with these tools 
(such as legal blackmail, opportunistic behaviour or frivolous lawsuit) outweighing their benefits 
(such as facilitating access to justice, enhancing deterrence or decreasing plaintiffs’ rational 
apathy).
5
 Great expectations have thus been placed on judges’ shoulders. Throughout the 
discussions a key issue has however been omitted: are these expectations realistic? In this article 
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we argue that the beliefs of policymakers contrast with insights from social sciences. Discussing 
judicial strengths and weaknesses in this context is relevant for policymakers, but also for judges 
and society at large. Expecting too much from judges who might not be able to live up to these 
expectations could be detrimental for the judiciary’s functioning and reputation. 
 
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the roles assigned to judges by 
policymakers in mass litigation. Section 3 studies judicial behaviour from the perspective of 
rational choice theory, whereas Section 4 adopts a behavioural approach and discusses the effects 
associated with the magnitude of mass cases on judicial decision-making. Section 5 applies these 
insights to the WCAM. Even though this proceeding is not per se litigation but a judicially 
scrutinised settlement agreement, it nonetheless constitutes a way to deal with mass claims that is 
to some extent comparable to mass litigation as such. Section 6 briefly concludes. 
 
 
2. A first view of the judicial cathedral: The role of judges in mass litigation as expected by 
policymakers  
 
The admissibility of a mass claim, its management and its final resolution are the essential duties 
that judges must endorse when monitoring mass cases. A pastoral allegory featuring a watchdog, 
a cattle driver and a good shepherd is instructive to distinguish the different dimensions of 
judicial intervention. Like the watchdog protecting a herd against external threats, the judiciary is 
asked to behave as a filter ensuring the group’s viability and scrutinizing the overall admissibility 
of the claim (2.1). Like the cattle driver who actively leads the herd to its final destination, judges 
should then ensure that cases make orderly progress and avoid the pitfalls associated with such 
complex and lengthy procedures (2.2). Finally, just as a good shepherd keeps track of his stray 
sheep, judges should take care of the parties’ different interests and supervise a final outcome 
deemed fair and equitable to all participants, and specifically to those who are absent or 
represented throughout the proceeding (2.3). The brief presentation of these three roles ultimately 
shed some light on what kind of judge policymakers ideally expect to deal with mass litigation 
(2.4). 
 
 
2.1 Watchdog 
 
Endorsing the role of watchdog – or gatekeeper – is a function that judges are used to perform in 
individual litigation.
6
 In the realm of mass litigation, judges are expected to behave as watchdogs 
first when verifying the admissibility of the mass claim and second when determining the shape 
and size of the claimant group.  
 
Judges must go through a kind of certification process where they will verify the number of 
involved claimants, the existence of common issues, the representativeness of representative 
bodies and/or lead counsels, the adequacy of the proceeding given the needs and particularities of 
the case at stake. In some cases, they may also be required to conduct a preliminary assessment of 
the merits of the claim. These different steps exist in every mass proceeding regardless of their 
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procedural design. A difference however consists in the way judges will formally fulfil their 
duties. Their intervention may go from a strict control over established criteria as the one 
conducted by American judges when certifying class actions who, depending on cases, must 
among other review the numerosity, commonality, adequacy or superiority criteria enshrined in 
FRCP Rule 23, to a more flexible and relaxed approach as for instance the one adopted by 
English judges when reviewing the admissibility of Group Litigation Orders (GLO).
7
 
 
In every mass proceeding judges must also scrutinize the size and the shape of the group and 
ensure a level of homogeneity within the claimant group. From a legal point of view, defining the 
group of plaintiffs is aimed at determining and circumscribing plaintiffs who will be bound by 
the final judgment and entitled to compensation. From an economic point of view, homogeneity 
within the claimant group has important effects: it facilitates economies of scale, reduces the risks 
of opportunistic behaviour such as free-riding, enhances the group’s bargaining power by 
reducing the risk of adverse selection and facilitates the use of cost-effective case management 
techniques such as test cases, samples or statistics which have progressively been employed by 
judges when facing scattered data and numerous parties.
8
 Furthermore, judges may define 
subgroups to take into account related claims brought by claimants with different interests or 
status or to ensure the adequate manageability of the case. Judges must also ensure that the case 
is adequately publicised in the media to allow potential claimants to step in (in case of opt in) or 
to step back (in case of opt out).
9
 By channelling information, judges consequently ensure that 
plaintiffs have a chance to be heard and to present objections. In doing so, judges should also 
remain highly precautionary given the important reputation costs borne by companies and 
businesses on such occasions.
10
 
 
 
2.2 Cattle driver 
 
The case management philosophy is known in continental systems where judges must already 
take active steps for the resolution of civil disputes.
11
 A similar tendency is noticeable in common 
law systems even though judges are there portrayed as traditionally more passive.
12
 Managerial 
judging is importantly reinforced and reaches its comprehensive meaning in the realm of mass 
litigation.
13
 Dealing with numerous plaintiffs sometimes located in several countries, exchanging 
with different counsels or handling a vast array of scattered data requires judges to develop 
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important managing skills. They may thus organise case management conferences, organise data 
gathering or ask for the opinions of experts and external help.  
 
 
2.3 Good shepherd 
 
The compensation and distribution stages have been sources of multiple concerns. Literature has 
notably pointed out the risks of seeing claimants’ interests ultimately diluted into the group and 
the risk of neglecting the interests of represented and absent claimants. Additionally, concerns 
have been expressed about possible under-compensation amounts that would undermine the 
overall deterrent effect of the proceeding (known as ‘coupons settlements’ in the United States) 
or alternatively about over-compensation amounts that would be detrimental for business and 
companies. Furthermore, warnings have been made concerning the risks of seeing compensation 
amounts ultimately kept by opportunistic intermediaries pursuing their own interests to the 
detriment of the group.
14
 Judges must therefore exert a high degree of care for absent and 
represented parties. As Posner pointed out in Reynolds v. Beneficial National Bank ‘we and other 
courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase of a class action suit a 
fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of 
fiduciaries’.15 
 
 
2.4 What kind of judges do policymakers expect to handle mass litigation? 
  
Stadler has raised an important question: what type of judges do we ultimately need to deal with 
mass litigation?
16
 Based on the three roles distinguished above, it appears that ideally judges 
should be active managers able to behave as a guide, support and arbiter; they should preferably 
be connected decision-makers at ease with communication tools such as the internet which allow 
them to communicate with all parties involved;
17
 they should behave as pragmatic decision-
makers fully aware of the practical and immediate consequences of their decision; they should 
avoid being numbed by the number of parties involved; they should be innovative and prone to 
develop new management techniques to cope with numerous claimants and help the case 
proceed; they should preferably be familiar to economic thinking and statistic reasoning to be 
able to define an optimal size for the claimant group;
18
 they should finally be sensitive to mass 
case’s different geometry by knowing how and when to balance group considerations with 
plaintiffs’ individual rights. 
                                                          
14
 C. Guthrie, ‘Risk-Preference Asymmetries in Class Action Litigation’, (119) Harvard Law Review 2005, p.587-
608; J.G. Backhaus, A. Cassone and G.B. Ramello (eds.), The Law and Economics of Class Actions in Europe: 
Lessons from America, New Horizons in Law and Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012. 
15
 Reynolds v. Beneficial National Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-80 - 7th Cir. 2002. 
16
 A. Stadler, ‘Collective Redress Litigation – A New Challenge for Courts in Europe’, in A. Bruns et al. (eds.), Liber 
Amicorum Rolf Stürner, Tübingen 2013; M. Faure, ‘CADR and Settlement of Claims – a Few Economic 
Observations’, in C. Hodges and A. Stadler, Resolving Mass Disputes – ADR and Settlements of Mass Claims, 
Edward Elgar Publishing 2013, p.38-60. 
17
 J.B. Weinstein, ‘The Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age’, (45) Columbia Journal of Law and 
Social Problems 2012, p.451-471. 
18
 D. Betson and J. Tidmarsh, ‘Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and “Invisible” Remedies’, (79) George 
Washington Law Review 2011, p.542-576 (suggesting that courts ‘should make optimal class size a relevant 
consideration’ when certifying, at p.568). 
5 
 
3. A second view of the judicial cathedral: mass litigation judges as perceived by rational 
choice theory 
 
When fulfilling all the tasks previously presented, policymakers have in mind a depersonalised 
image of the judiciary. They expect them to behave as robust and neutral umpires while 
performing under considerable burden. However, research suggests that judges cannot be 
perceived as mere ‘disinterested administrators of justice’ but should rather be viewed as ‘deeply 
interested participants’.19 Furthermore, judges monitoring class action lawsuits tend to leave their 
role of external manager to behave as full ‘players’.20 These remarks therefore invite us to 
question what it is that judges want when monitoring mass claim. Law and Economics scholars 
dealing with judicial behaviour consider that judges have preferences and, like other people, 
respond to incentives (3.1). From this starting point, it is possible to identify the preferences of 
judges when resolving mass cases (3.2). The flexibility associated with standards that usually 
regulate judicial behaviour on these occasions allows them to express their choices (3.3). This 
ultimately allows predicting how rational maximizing judges may behave when managing mass 
claims (3.4). 
 
 
3.1 Judges have preferences and respond to incentives 
 
Approaches based on rational choice theory are aimed at clarifying judges’ incentives and at 
exploring what judges want and how judges think.
21
 The starting hypothesis posits that judges, 
like all human beings, act as rational and interested individuals. They respond to incentives and 
have a utility function which includes a set of preferences (referred to as ‘arguments’) that they 
seek to maximize under constraints. In the aftermath of Cooter and Posner,
22
 Law and Economics 
scholars have posited that judges principally seek non-monetary payoffs in their work, such as 
reputation, prestige, powers or decrease in workload.
23
 Financial incentives may also play a role, 
albeit to a lesser extent. Empirical research conducted in common law and civil law countries has 
extensively supported these findings and for example substantiated judges’ concerns for career 
advancement,
24
 or their willingness to decrease their workload.
25
 Other studies have also stressed 
the role played by judges’ reputation within judiciaries.26 
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3.2 What do mass litigation judges strive for?  
 
The judicial preferences previously identified are particularly relevant in the field of mass 
litigation. Research regarding individual litigation argues that decisions taken by insulated judges 
can often be regarded as ‘low-cost decisions’: while having an effect on litigants, they induce 
neither direct nor personal costs on insulated judges.
27
 Transplanted to the field of mass litigation, 
this assumption becomes questionable: choices that judges make have direct and long-lasting 
consequences on their well-being. Choices to define a group broadly, to control the adequate and 
effective communication between the class representative and the group, to convey information 
to parties or to spend time scrutinizing every individual claim forming the group rather than to 
focus on the group as a whole drastically increases their workload, their administrative burden or 
their public exposure. In other words, when managing mass disputes, judges can be seen as 
agents dealing with competing costly alternatives.
28
 Assuming that they behave as rational actors 
maximizing their individual utility, they ultimately choose between the options that yield them 
the highest personal reward at the lowest cost. The number of parties, the administrative burden 
associated with the administration of mass cases, the high costs of notification, aversion to the 
enhanced public exposure that is inevitably associated with high-profile cases are among the 
costs that judges may want to avoid. Alternatively, a taste for power, a quest for prestige and 
fame, public attention within the legal audience, or search for career advancement can be viewed 
as benefits that judges may seek to achieve.  
 
 
3.3 How do mass litigation judges express their preferences?  
 
Policymakers usually refer to standards, as opposed to strict rules, to regulate and guide the 
judicial monitoring of mass claims. Law and Economics scholars have extensively debated the 
conditions under which the use of standards or of rules – in other word the degree of precision 
that should be associated with the law - is more desirable to monitor behaviour.
29
 When 
compared to rules, standards avoid the costs of ex ante particularizing situations and make it 
easier for judges to ex post adapt their behaviour to the peculiarities of the case that they have to 
manage. Standards have thus been advocated as means facilitating judicial flexibility necessary 
for the treatment of mass claim. How and how many test cases should be ordered, how and how 
many subgroups should be defined, on which criteria should the group be defined, how should 
the case be advertised in the media, how should the merits of individual claim be assessed or to 
what extent should individual issues prevail are – among many others – questions that will 
extensively depend on the nature of the dispute at stake. Furthermore, standards appear also 
useful in situations where policymakers have only a limited knowledge of how judges should 
adequately handle cases. In mass litigation, it is not certain that policymakers have clear ideas 
about the way judges should handle cases. They thus tend to rely on judges’ expertise and 
competences. Standards however induce several costs. They notably delegate a large extent of the 
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work to the judiciary. In doing so, they increase agency costs and make it more difficult to 
control judicial behaviour.
30
 They also drastically increase discretionary decisions which in the 
Law and Economics literature are usually envisioned as a leeway for the expressions of personal 
preferences and biases.
31
 
 
 
3.4 Predicting behaviour of rational utility maximizing judges: gurus and/or followers 
 
Judges have preferences and find in standards that loosely regulate their behaviour a venue to 
express their own views. It remains however to predict how rational utility maximizing judges 
might behave. In this view, a key issue consists of determining whether judges will consider mass 
claims as an opportunity and thus be willing to maximize the benefits previously identified, or 
alternatively as a misfortune and thus be willing to principally minimize the costs previously set 
forth. For matters of clarity, one can first distinguish the attitude of judges behaving as gurus 
from the attitude of judges acting as followers. Both types of attitudes have been substantiated in 
practice and show long-lasting implications on the management and resolution of mass claims. 
 
The term ‘guru’ is borrowed from by McGovern who noticed that ‘the incentives of judges to be 
viewed as gurus of mass torts have become strong’.32 A judge-guru is more likely to maximize 
arguments of his utility function such as reputation, prestige, power, career concerns and his taste 
for public service. Conversely, his desire to decrease his workload or to maximize leisure will be 
secondary. He will therefore be highly active in developing a comprehensive case management 
approach so as to control all the facets of the case at stake. Yet, even though the active attitude of 
the judge-guru appears particularly well-fitted for the conduct of mass litigation, this behaviour 
can turn out to be costly for parties and society. First, the judge-guru may be tempted to impose 
his own views on the litigation, or to dictate his own solution to the case even though his 
perceptions may not be perfectly aligned with the expectations of parties. He may leave his role 
of active judge to endorse the more problematic role of activist judge that could jeopardize his 
impartiality and independence. An example can be found in the behaviour of judge Weinstein 
when monitoring the Agent Orange class action lawsuit brought by Vietnam War Veterans who 
had been exposed to a harmful herbicide. His extensively discussed intervention was welcomed 
as ‘a virtuoso performance of judicial management’.33 However, observers also pointed out that 
the judge used his powers in ‘an aggressive way’ and took decisions that a majority of plaintiffs 
was not eager to adopt.
34
 He also ‘made highly questionable decisions while working for a 
settlement that would render them invulnerable to appeal’.35 Such a situation ultimately questions 
the legitimacy of judge-gurus – who in Europe are not elected - to take such important decisions 
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that influence the welfare of many citizens. Going a step further (already introducing an insight 
from behavioural economics, an approach to which we will return in Section 4), the judge-guru 
may also be particularly prone to the egocentric bias which refers to the tendency of individuals 
to view themselves as being above-average, immunized against the mistakes usually made by 
their fellow human beings. Rachlinski, Guthrie and Wistrich found that judges were likely to be 
influenced by this bias.
36
 As Weinstein highlighted, ‘one danger that every judge must guard 
against is ego [since] the sense of power and prestige in supervising mass tort or public interest 
case are heady’.37  
 
Alternatively, judges will behave as followers when they primarily rely on parties to frame and 
manage issues. They rationally adopt an attitude that could be qualified as being more passive. 
The monitoring of mass cases indeed induces great costs that they may seek to avoid or to 
minimize. Albeit still present in his utility function, a judge-follower is therefore less influenced 
by prestige, reputation or career concerns and, in turn, is more trying to decrease his workload. 
As anecdotal evidence, a lawyer depicted the attitude of Justice Pratt who was first in charge of 
the Agent Orange Class Action as the one of an ‘absentee landlord’.38 The course of action of the 
judge-follower may be twofold. First, assuming that he is not eager to exert a high level of effort, 
he may essentially refer to focal points to drive the behaviours of parties toward a given outcome 
at lesser costs to himself. Second, following the assumptions formulated by Macey,
39
 a judge-
follower is also more likely to spend time overviewing the procedural fairness of the litigation 
where he can use his general skills, rather than to spend time scrutinizing in-depth the substance 
of the case for which more technical and specific skills are required. In an attempt to decrease 
workload and reduce dockets, some scholars have argued that judges may be tempted to clear 
settlements by simply agreeing without contestation with the work performed by parties.
40
 
Behaving differently would represent burdensome alternatives which could impair judicial 
resources. Empirical research on judicial review of attorney fees in class action lawsuits tends to 
substantiate this idea.
41
 The attitude of the judge-follower is however problematic. First, parties 
principally lead the case and as judge Weinstein has noticed from his own practice, ‘in mass tort 
cases, the judge often cannot rely on the litigants to frame the issues appropriately’.42 Assuming 
that he is more likely to scrutinize the procedural fairness of a settlement than to focus in depth 
on its substance, he may be misled by stakeholders’ strategies which would give only an 
‘appearance of fairness’ to the final outcome.43 Second, low-effort judges who tend to favour 
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settlements at unequal terms may ultimately lead defendants to overinvest in prevention.
44
 Third, 
and on a broader scale, the attitude of the judge-follower can be viewed as a ‘serious abdication 
of judicial responsibility’ misunderstood by the legal profession and the public.45 As Marcus 
expresses it, ‘(…) judges’ substantive preferences in mass tort litigation may tempt them to be 
less rigorous at the very time when they should be most demanding’.46 
 
Undoubtedly, judges dealing with mass cases will be more eager to behave as gurus or followers 
depending on the developments of the case at stake. These two expected attitudes however do not 
seem to fit the expectations expressed by policymakers. 
 
 
4. A third view of the judicial cathedral: mass litigation judges as perceived by behavioural 
economics  
 
Departing from rational choice theory, behavioural law and economics has incorporated insights 
from psychology and cognitive sciences as a way to propose a more realistic image of human 
behaviour.
47
 Theoretically, judicial decision-making should not be altered by the magnitude of 
mass claim or by the fact that many parties are involved. In a recent interview, albeit conducted 
in a different context, the President of the German Constitutional Court was for instance asked 
whether a lawsuit filed by 37,000 individuals weighs more than a lawsuit filed by a single 
plaintiff. His reply was blatantly negative: ‘we do not count but we ask ourselves whether the 
claim is meritless or not’.48 Behavioural research tends however to portray judges as boundedly 
rational, biased and sensitive decision-makers (4.1). The magnitude of mass litigation may 
therefore have an impact on their decision-making (4.2). These insights suggest that judge can 
also be numbed by the magnitude of mass litigation (4.3). 
 
 
4.1 Judges as boundedly rational, biased and sensitive decision-makers 
 
Following the seminal work of the Nobel Prize Laureate Simon, behavioural research considers 
that judges, like all human beings are boundedly rational.
 49
 As Simon explained, rationality is 
bounded ‘when it falls short of omniscience’.50 Individuals have limited computational skills and 
capacities and therefore a limit exists to the number of options that the human brain can 
effectively entertain. Furthermore, contexts and environments in which individuals evolve are 
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highly uncertain and unpredictable. Judges therefore do not behave as optimizers but rather as 
satisficers, seeking a solution that is merely good enough or sufficient.
51
  
 
Recent research has also shown that judges are receptive to cognitive errors and illusions such as 
the hindsight bias (the tendency to overstate the likelihood of past events, knowing in hindsight 
that they have actually occurred), anchoring (the propensity to base a decision on external 
information - relevant or irrelevant to the decision at hand - which modifies the standard of 
reference) or framing (processing information differently depending on the manner the issue is 
worded, for example as loss or as profit). Extensive empirical research conducted with judges 
tends to support these findings.
52
  
 
Finally, judges are portrayed as not only cognitively boundedly rational but also as emotionally 
boundedly rational decision-makers. Although for long denied,
53
 the role of judge’s emotions has 
experienced renewed impetus and is nowadays perceived as a ‘field whose time has to come’.54 
 
 
4.2 The mass litigation context and its effect on decision-making 
 
Decision-making is influenced by the idiosyncrasies of the decision-maker, by the characteristics 
of the tasks he performs, and also importantly by contexts.
 55
 The context of mass litigation 
therefore matters and has an effect on judicial decision-making. Even though mass cases are 
brought to courts by representative associations or leading lawyers, judges take their decisions in 
the shadow of numerous represented and absent parties. Furthermore, mass cases are likely to be 
emotionally charged since they often deal with controversial societal issues such as large-scale 
accidents, diseases or defective products. They represent a psychological burden not only for 
parties, but also for judges.
56
 Behavioural research has shown that people do not perceive 
individuals as they perceive groups 
57
and that also professionals may take different decisions 
when facing a single person rather than a group.
58
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4.3 Judges numbed by numbers? Two examples: The identifiable victim and the outlier effects 
 
In the mass litigation context, judicial decision-making may be subject to numbing. Two effects 
are here of particular interest, namely the identifiable victim effect and the outlier effect.  
 
One could theoretically expect that extra attention and extra precaution will be dedicated to 
decisions that can impact on the welfare of a large number of people, no matter if the targets are 
clearly identified or not.
59
 This issue is cornerstone in the realm of mass litigation. Claimants are 
indeed largely depersonalised and tend to be merely considered en masse.
60
 Others have 
suggested that the ‘tragic aspect of mass torts is that individual harm becomes routinized’.61 As 
said previously, judges are expected to behave as fiduciaries. In others words, they should be 
highly careful vis-a-vis absent or represented parties. In the aftermath of Schelling, behavioural 
research has however extensively described a so-called identifiable victim effect to refer to a 
decrease in sensitivity vis-à-vis unidentified victims.
62
 Abundant empirical evidence has shown 
that people are more willing to exert a higher degree of attention and effort when their actions or 
decisions are directed toward identified targets.
63
 Also, harms affecting a larger number of people 
are ultimately perceived with less severity than harms affecting a smaller number of individuals. 
Analysis of awards granted by juries in 136 recent American toxic tort cases shows that juries 
have compensated each victim less in tort cases when there are more victims.
64
  
 
The second cognitive illusion is known as the outlier effect. Group members turn out not to be 
assigned a same weight within the group and decision-makers are often blinded by the presence 
of stronger claimants. In an experiment conducted with mock jurors, evidence was found that 
jurors facing complex cases and high information-load are less and less able to distinguish 
between plaintiffs.
65
 Information about a group member that stands above the average is thus 
more likely to be easily recalled. The outlier effect can influence the way the group is perceived 
in several ways. On the one hand, the presence of an outlier may lead to the assimilation of all 
pending cases – even the weakest ones – to the situation of the outlier.66 Also juries seem to use 
the judgement of the outlier ‘as a threshold test [:] if they decided that the company was indeed 
liable for the outlier’s injuries then all plaintiffs benefitted. If not, then all suffered.’67 The 
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presence of outliers is therefore likely to have important implications on verdicts about liability 
or on the assessment of damages. The asbestos class action lawsuit Cimino v. Raymark Industries 
Inc. is illustrative.
68
 In his report, the Special Master appointed in this case first recommended to 
exclude from the claimant group mesothelioma plaintiffs on the basis that this subgroup 
represented only a small percentage of the total claims, but their disease was far more severe than 
other pleural or asbestosis plaintiffs who were also taking part to the dispute. It was thus feared 
that ‘the jury may be unduly influenced by dramatic illness which make up a small percentage of 
the plaintiffs’ class’.69  Alternatively, the presence of outliers can exacerbate contrast effects. An 
experiment conducted with American judges found that judges are likely to be receptive to this 
bias.
70
 By contrast, weaker arguments make other arguments appear stronger. Stronger claims 
that are mixed with weaker aggregated plaintiffs would thus appear stronger than they actually 
are. And the other way around, weaker aggregated plaintiffs may in turn suffer from the presence 
of outliers. When compared to the claims of stronger claimants, their own claims might be 
perceived as being weaker than they truly are. There is thus a chance that weaker aggregated 
plaintiffs receive less than if their cases were brought individually and separately.
71
 
 
 
5. The insights applied to Dutch judges handling WCAM cases 
 
Introduced into the Dutch legal system as a practical and emergency solution to the DES case 
deadlock, the WCAM has contrary to initial expectations progressively been employed to deal 
with different fields of substantive law and shown long-standing cross-border implications.
72
 
Judges have been assigned a cornerstone role for the monitoring of the WCAM (5.1). Yet the 
proceeding heavily depends on judges’ attitudes and may be subject to their biases (5.2). One 
may however wonder whether the fact judges presiding WCAMs sit in panel has an effect on 
their attitudes and decision-making (5.3). 
 
 
5.1 The WCAM judges as watchdogs, cattle drivers and good shepherds 
 
As Van Boom has observed, ‘the position of the Amsterdam Court is unmistakably crucial for the 
credibility of the WCAM as an instrument for the efficient and fair settlement of mass claims’.73 
The proceeding indeed heavily relies on judicial performance.  
 
Following the classification previously established, WCAM judges will act as watchdogs when 
verifying the adequate representativeness of the associations or foundations and their ability to 
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sufficiently represent the interests of represented parties. They will also channel and monitor 
information so as to ensure that all potential claimants can ultimately opt out the proceeding or 
present objections to the agreement.
74
 Furthermore, the legislative amendment of July 2013 
renewing the WCAM framework has intensified the role of WCAM judges as cattle drivers.
75
 By 
scheduling a preliminary appearance (preprocessuele comparitie), which may be requested by the 
representative body, by the alleged defendant or by joint application, judges may become particularly 
active for the monitoring of the case.
76
 In such an appearance the parties can discuss the way in 
which they will try to reach a settlement, or discuss other ways to end the dispute (e.g. by 
mediation). The judge plays a ‘facilitating and guiding role’ here, without actually taking 
decisions.
77
 He can assist the parties in formulating the most important points of conflict and 
stimulate them to reach agreement. Interference of a judge may also induce unwilling parties to 
consider a settlement. As evidenced by the DSB WCAM currently under judicial review, judges 
may also organise hearings (regiezitting) to discuss case management issues.
78
 Finally, WCAM 
judges will act as good shepherds when reviewing the fairness of the proposed settlement. On this 
occasion, they will endorse the role of ‘negotiorum gestor’ for the absent and represented 
parties.
79
 They may also review lawyers’ fees when these amounts are taken out of the settlement 
fund.
80
 This judicial intrusion within the content of a transaction freely agreed by parties could at 
first sight be seen as contrary to the traditional rule of contractual freedom. Mass settlements 
however are not private settlements: they do not solely address the private interests at stake but 
have also ‘quasi-public components’ since they involve a large number of people and deal with 
highly mediatised social issues.
81
  
 
Los, vice-president of the Amsterdam Court of Appeals and involved in several WCAM rulings, 
recently focussed attention on the role of the judge in the WCAM.
 
One of the issues he discussed 
was whether the WCAM judge should execute a full evaluation of the settlement agreement 
(which requires, among others, information on the relevant circumstances of the case, of which it 
is not clear how the judge should acquire this information), or ‘merely’ a marginal evaluation 
(assessing if there are reasons to reject the settlement).
82 
In Los’ view the WCAM evaluation in 
practise tends towards a marginal evaluation, which is strongly based on what the parties present. 
This in his view is understandable, given that the WCAM is in essence an individual procedure 
where the parties determine the boundaries within which the judge has to operate. According to 
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Klaassen however, the goal of the WCAM in principle would justify and require a more 
independent research of the judge.
83
 Klaassen states in this respect that ‘the (desirable) task of the 
judge regarding the WCAM-procedure is not fully clear and can be debated’.84 The choice 
between both types of evaluation clearly affects what exactly is expected from the judge, but in 
either case the judge is assigned a fundamental role in the procedure. 
 
 
5.2 The WCAM is dependent on judicial attitudes and biases 
 
Los points out that, even though the WCAM is in principle an individual procedure where the 
parties set the stage, the fact that third parties are affected by the ruling as well could justify that 
judges take a more active role in which they do not restrict themselves to the mere information 
brought by parties, but rather ensure that third parties have a possibility to take part in the debates 
since their own interests are in play.
85
 Contrary to this idea, the literature presented suggests that 
judges may notably be incentivized to remain passive. Indeed, they intervene after the agreement 
between parties has been reached. It is therefore less costly for judges to strongly rely on the 
work performed by parties, or to simply overlook the procedural aspects of the agreement without 
further in debt-analysis. Since many commentators have drawn parallels between the WCAM and 
US class action settlements it is interesting to notice that such attitude has been substantiated in 
the practice of American judges.
86
 On a broader scale, such insights therefore tend to question 
whether policymakers can realistically strongly rely on the performance of judges.
87
 
 
 
5.3 WCAM judges sit in panels. Does this mitigate their attitudes and possible biases?  
 
WCAM judges usually sit in panels. An important observation consist therefore of saying that the 
interested attitudes and biases previously identified are ultimately mitigated by the simple fact 
that judges discuss and exchange with their colleagues. The judge-guru may for instance be more 
prone to discussions and the judge-follower facing the watchful eyes of his peers may be 
incentivized to be more active. In the same vein, their biases would also be mitigated by the mere 
confrontations of judicial point of views. This idea is consequently straightforward and indeed 
appealing: several judges may do it better. 
 
The effects of panels on judicial decision-making have however revealed to be ambiguous. 
Indeed, panels can create contexts allowing judges to share their knowledge, competences and 
skills and thus decrease the likelihood of cognitive biases or systemic errors that are usually 
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committed by single judges.
88
 Research found evidence highlighting that groups tend to perform 
better than the best individuals to complex intellective problems.
89
 Scholars have also pointed out 
a possible ‘group polarization’ likely to occur in panels which can lead judges to make more 
extreme, controversial or unpopular decisions than a decision-maker would have done 
alone.
90
And the other way around, decisions rendered by panels can also be suboptimal. 
Information is processed differently and part of it can be omitted or neglected. Judges may be 
driven by personal incentives such as showing off their personal competences in front of their 
colleagues. The behaviour and decisions of high-status, charismatic or senior judges may for 
instance influence the other members of the panel.
91
 Finally, time pressure may amplify the use 
of simple heuristics and facilitate erroneous assumptions.
92
 Far from being alleviated or 
suppressed, interested attitudes, biases and cognitive errors may therefore be aggravated. It is 
therefore far from obvious that the mere fact for WCAMs judges of sitting in panels is a 
sufficient barrier to mitigate the effects associated with interested attitudes and biases.  
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Policymakers have a view of the relationship between judges and mass claim that is mostly one-
sided: judges have a key role to play for the management and resolution of mass claims. The 
insights from social disciplines which we have discussed in this contribution have shown that this 
relationship is actually double-sided: judges do not only have an important role in mass litigation, 
but mass claims also may have a great impact on judicial attitudes and decision-making. The 
personality of judges therefore contributes to shaping the outcomes of mass disputes. The 
WCAM example shows that also in that procedure the way in which judges will ultimately 
understand and perform their roles importantly matters.  
 
These insights ultimately suggest that judges are not mere neutral and robust decision makers and 
that the great expectations that have been placed on their shoulders might not always be realistic. 
In our view, in evaluating and adapting existing forms of mass litigation as well as in designing 
new forms, it remains essential to keep such perspectives in mind in order to avoid placing too 
much emphasis on judges’ discretionary powers and attitudes. 
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